This collection contains 34 essays, 23 of them previously published, written between 1939 and 1960. They are of varying lengths, generality, and polish; and they cover the wide range of Hall's philosophical interests from metaphilosophy and value theory—the subjects of his best known books—to the theory of perception and the inadequacies of the Oxford philosophy of a decade ago. For Hall the study of language was not a way of repudiating or avoiding the traditional translingual issues, but rather a method (...) for attacking them. One might say that like Leibniz, Kant, and the early Wittgenstein, in their different ways, Hall took "the general form of propositions" as a philosopher's key to the basic categories of reality. Because his idiom was unfashionable among metaphysicians and because his doctrines were alien to the so-called "analysts," his work has not been widely influential. But the many insights and suggestions in this book may yet be taken up. These essays illuminate Hall's books, What Is Value?, Our Knowledge of Fact and Value, and Philosophical Systems; and they also make up an important work on their own account.—C. T. W. (shrink)

Five essays, each on a different contemporary philosopher. Those on Franco Lombardi, Sartre, and Leszek Kolakowski and other present-day revisionist Marxists were presented at an American Philosophical Association symposium in 1961; the studies of Xavier Zubiri and Heidegger were added specially for this volume. In each case the authors endeavor to say something fresh and substantial; yet each piece is written in a clear and non-technical style. The anthology is therefore to be recommended to those new to the various "continental" (...) ways of doing philosophy, as well as to initiates.—C. T. W. (shrink)

This book is divided into two general parts: an exposition of Trendelenburg's thought which is admirably written; and an attempt to provide "demonstrative evidence" of Dewey's "dependence" upon Trendelenburg's influence. In fact the evidence is not decisive, but consists rather in citation of many parallels in the themes and doctrines of the two thinkers, and in George Sylvester Morris, who was Trendelenburg's student for three semesters and Dewey's teacher for one, and whose work does show the direct influence of Trendelenburg. (...) The difficulty with Rosenstock's thesis is, first, that many of Dewey's ideas cited in support of it also echo those of other, principally Germanic, predecessors; and, second, that it is just as plausible, given the lack of any explicit tie-up of Dewey and Trendelenburg, that their ideas developed independently in response to similar philosophical milieu. And indeed the author shows how much alike their philosophical adversaries were. But in spite of the possible inconclusiveness of his book, Rosenstock has shown that Trendelenburg was a forerunner of John Dewey and an undeservedly neglected thinker. Rosenstock might well put us in his debt now by giving us a full and critical treatment of Trendelenburg's work.—C. T. W. (shrink)

A paperback anthology in the Macmillan "Sources in Philosophy" series, this small volume should serve nicely to give beginning students such selected matter for their thought that, if diligent, they might after working through it tackle almost anything written on the subject. What's more, it promises to do this for a topic for which a spate of comparable texts do not already exist, namely, the metaphysics of the "Anglo-american" philosophical tradition. There are five essays on basic metaphysical "schools"—materialism, idealism, absolutism, (...) etc; six on basic metaphysical concepts—substance, universals, identity; and three on metaphysical meaning, judgments, and arguments. All but four of the essays were written after 1910. Baylis contributes a fine introduction.—C. T. W. (shrink)

There is little danger of praising this book too highly: not because it is the last word on the subject but hopefully because it is, in a very real sense, the first. For as convincingly as seems possible in a work of this scope, and in the face of a long and monolithic tradition to the contrary, Danto shows Nietzsche to have produced a profound philosophical system which is highly pertinent to current work in philosophy and in many respects in (...) clear anticipation of it. The exposition of this system so consistently and brilliantly illuminates its formerly obscure recesses that one can scarcely question whether Danto is on the right track. He argues cogently that Nietzsche's theory of truth is fictionalistic, perspectivistic, and pragmatic ; and upon this interpretation of the theory Danto constructs analytical accounts of Nietzsche's doctrines on psychology, morality, values, and religion, and on the widely misunderstood principle of the Will-to-Power. In the light of the volumes of commentary written on these topics, and in their own right, these accounts are superlatively clear and penetrating. Of whatever persuasion or purpose, future work on Nietzsche must take account of this book.—C. T. W. (shrink)

An elaborate epitomization of the thought of all the main philosophers, grouped according to the conventional "schools of thought." The scope of the undertaking in this introductory text is ambitious, though some may feel that its manner of categorizing philosophers tends to blur the line between epitome and caricature.—C. T. W.

In spite of its title, this volume sheds no new light on the debated problem of whether Peirce's ideas form, or can be reconstructed to form, an integrated and internally consistent system. The book, instead, avoids the problem entirely, the pith of its thesis about the unity of Peirce's philosophy being that, in various guises, the notion of Thirdness permeates his thought. Apparently, Haas thinks it evident that to point up the central role of this notion in each of Peirce's (...) subdivisions of philosophy—Phenomenology, Logic, and Metaphysics—is to show the unity of the philosophy as a whole. But he does not counter any specific charges brought against this claim of unity—though he mentions some of them—or even outline how the conception of law is to vindicate this claim. What he does do, following Peirce's three-fold division of philosophy, is to conduct a survey built around the Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness theme; and this exposition, though uncritical, is not lacking in care and subtlety, so that those looking for an overview of Peirce's thought can profit from the book.—C. T. W. (shrink)

Although extremely comprehensive in its subject-matter, catholic in its treatment of diverse points of view, and lucid, this book is not simply a survey. Rather, it is, in its own way, original—not because any information or thesis it contains is new, but because it offers a clear, synoptic, and sophisticated look at what has been a relatively ill-defined and fragmented sector of philosophy, that of determining the nature of the "behavioral sciences." Kaplan's way of accomplishing this is to consider the (...) concepts and activities of science "functionally"; and he generally finds that "no one function can suffice" to show us what, e.g., a law of nature is, or what an experiment is, or what a model is, etc. Thus he typically finds other, mutually competing theories both partially true and too narrow. He also has much that is illuminating to say about the Deweyan ideas that the logic of science is fundamentally a "logic-in-use" ; and that scientific concepts are "open" and properly depend on the context of inquiry, rather than on the logician, for their "closure." Consonant with these themes is his stress on the openness of the concept of methodology itself: behavioral scientists, he contends, will gain no salvation merely by finding better procedures. Of greater importance are the values, choices, and invention of the inquirer himself; and Kaplan, accordingly, treats these matters in detail.—C. T. W. (shrink)